This is due partly to the unwieldiness of overgrown legis¬ lative assemblies and the lack of responsible leadership; partly to the enormous demand for legislation, to meet which overtaxes the legis¬ lative machine; and partly to the complexity and intricacy of modern legislation, which enhances the difficulty of framing statutes and re¬ quires an amount of technical knowledge which the average legislator does not possess. A legislative assembly composed of five or six hundred members without an effective organization and without recognized and responsible leaders is not very unlike a mob.
Such a body, like other mobs, must be guided and led if it accomplishes its work. Mr. Bryce has indicted the possible solutions of the problem of legis¬ lation by assemblies of this character .
1 One is to restrict the action of the assembly to a comparatively few simple matters, reserving the others to a smaller body or to the executive. This was the method of the Romans, whose comitia had merely the power of adopting or rejecting measures proposed by the magistrates .
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In a modified form, it was also the method of the French during the second Empire, when the laws were drafted by the council of state and laid before the legislature by the Emperor, who alone had the right of initiation .
3
The second solution is for the legislature to delegate the power of legislation to a single commit¬ tee composed of members who are at the same time the chief officers of the executive department, the chamber merely retaining the right of veto. This is the system actually followed in England and to a less de¬ gree in other countries where the true parliamentary system is in force.
A third solution is for the assembly to divide itself into a number of committees among which all legislative projects are distributed and which 1 The American Commonwealth, vol. i, These measures and these only are usually adopted by the assembly. This is the American method.
Of these three methods, the first may be ruled out of consideration, leaving the choice to be made from the last two.
The parliamentary system in one form or another is the solution which has been adopted in the vast majority of countries, whether they be monarchies or republics, whether they have written or unwritten con¬ stitutions. In some of them, the ministers are at the same time members of the legislature; in others they are not, yet practically everywhere they have seats in the legislature with the right to initiate legislation and to be heard whenever they demand it. The heads of departments are chief clerks. Instead of being the min¬ istry, the organs of the executive powers, and imparting a kind of mo¬ mentum to the operation of the laws, they are precluded even from com¬ munication with the House by reports.
In other countries they may speak as well as act. We allow them to do neither.
We forbid them even the use of a speaking-trumpet; or more properly, as the Consti¬ tution has ordained that they shall be dumb, we forbid them to explain themselves by signs. Two evils, obvious to you, result from all this. The efficiency of government is reduced to a minimum-the proneness of a popular body to usurpation is already advancing to its maximum; committees already are the ministers; and while the house indulges a jealousy of encroachment in its functions, which are properly deliber¬ ative, it does not perceive that these are impaired and nullified by the monopoly as well as the perversion of information by these committees.
It is not at all improbable that the full parliamentary system would have been introduced in the beginning had it not been for the widespread fear of executive domination and tyranny due to the arbitrary conduct of the crown and of the colonial executives in America which had pro¬ duced very strained relations between them and the legislative assem¬ blies.
The result was that the English cabinet system was in more 
